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HOW MEYER V. UBER COULD
DEMONSTRATE THAT UBER AND THE
SHARING ECONOMY FIT INTO
ANTITRUST LAW
Nicholas Andrew Passaro*
Recently, Uber driver (and former Uber CEO) Travis Kalanick has
been sued under antitrust laws.  The plaintiffs argue that Mr. Kalanick and
the other Uber drivers have engaged in a price fixing arrangement that vio-
lates §1 of the Sherman Act.  The case, Meyer v. Uber (originally Meyer v.
Kalanick), is still being litigated.  This Comment will analyze each side’s
potential arguments and will ultimately conclude that the court should find
Uber drivers not guilty of a Sherman Act violation.  This determination
will be based on: the merits of the various arguments, how such a holding
would fit within the history of antitrust law, and how it would set effective
precedent for the future.  Additionally, this Comment argues that Uber’s
place in the sharing economy distinguishes it from previous antitrust viola-
tors the plaintiffs will likely analogize it to.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
Legal practitioners in many different practice areas have and will con-
tinue to struggle with the application of current jurisprudence to the shar-
ing economy.  Accordingly, this Comment argues that the sharing
economy should influence market definition in antitrust litigation.  This
Comment, however, continues to argue that such an impact will not re-
quire a restructuring of market definition analysis; there is room within the
hypothetical monopolist test and within the existing antitrust legal frame-
work to accommodate the challenges presented by the sharing economy.
Part I will provide an introduction to the sharing economy and the
Meyer v. Uber litigation.  Part II will analyze the merits of the legal argu-
ments the parties will likely make in antitrust litigation.  Part III will dis-
cuss the role unique aspects of the sharing economy play in the analysis of
the antitrust principles governing market definition.  Part IV will analyze
how the reasoning of the Meyer v. Uber decision could impact future shar-
ing economy platforms in the antitrust realm.
B. An Introduction to the Sharing Economy
Many antitrust decisions turn on the definition of the relevant market.
The parties in Meyer v. Uber1 have made the typical product and geo-
graphic market definition arguments thus far.  Namely, these arguments
are geographic limitations, suitable substitutes, elasticity of demand, and
barriers to entry.  The parties, however, have failed to acknowledge
Uber’s role in the sharing economy, an industry fundamentally different
from traditional commerce.
The sharing economy refers to the emergence of peer-to-peer services.
These services allow owners to give strangers access to their property dur-
ing the time(s) when the owner does not wish to use it.2  Peer-to-peer
markets allow small suppliers to compete with traditional providers of the
same good or service, making it easy for buyers to engage in convenient,
generally trustworthy transactions.3  These services are often provided in
app or webpage forms, have surged in popularity, and can offer a much
1. Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), sub nom. Meyer v. Uber
Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017).
2. See Giana M. Eckhardt & Fleura Bardhi, The Sharing Economy Isn’t About Shar-
ing at All, HARV. BUS. REV. (January 28, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/01/the-sharing-economy-
isnt-about-sharing-at-all.
3. See generally Liran Einav, Chiara Farronato & Jonathan Levin, Peer-to-Peer Mar-
kets, Working Paper No. 21496, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. (Aug. 2015), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w21496.pdf. These markets favor small suppliers because they have
much lower overhead and investment costs because they already own their property and
time, compared to a company that has to buy the property and hire employees. For example,
Airbnb allows owners to rent their homes (or rooms) to others when the owners are not
utilizing them in exchange for rental money. Other services include Uber (driving services),
DogVacay (dog sitting), and Turo (vehicle rentals).
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more cost-effective substitute to traditional models.  As a result, tradi-
tional businesses are losing consumers to peer-to-peer services.  These ser-
vices allow everyday people with (or without) other full-time careers to
earn extra income by renting out the things they own (or their time) when
that property would otherwise be sitting idle.  In Uber’s case, the owner of
the vehicle is not only renting out the vehicle, but also providing the ser-
vice of driving. Therefore, an Uber driver is renting out her vehicle and
her time in exchange for income when both would otherwise be unused.
The people who offer property and/or services on these platforms are
blurring the line between private owners and business operators.  As a
result, peer-to-peer services have caused a host of regulatory and tax is-
sues in jurisdictions all over the world.  For example, in San Francisco, the
average Airbnb host rents their room fifty-eight nights each year;4 this
level of volume makes the choice to treat the owner either as a Best West-
ern or as a typical private homeowner a challenging one.  Additionally,
New York City completed 828 inspections and issued 2,239 violations for
short-term rentals in 2012 alone.5  These violations further demonstrate
the gray zone created by peer-to-peer services between private owners and
businesses.  New York City allows Airbnb to operate its service, yet it in-
spects and issues violations for certain types of rentals.6  Cities all over the
world are struggling to fit the unique nature of sharing economy platforms
into their existing legal framework, and thus far the effort has been
problematic.
This struggle is epitomized by the case of EatWith, a website that con-
nects diners with home chefs who want to host a meal.7  EatWith was
founded in 2012 in Tel Aviv and landed in New York City in 2013.8  The
website allows budding chefs to build a reputation, test their menus, re-
ceive feedback from unbiased diners, and earn some extra income.  As
demonstrated by an individual chef who now owns and operates two of his
own restaurants, EatWith can serve as a launching pad for new chefs en-
tering a market.9  According to New York City Health Department
Spokeswoman Veronica Lewin, however, New York City’s current legal
framework provides that “people who offer meals to the public for money
4. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2013, at 9.
5. Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Sharing Economy, FORBES
(Jan 23, 2013, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/aribnb-and-the-
unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/#6240e907aae3.
6. See Katie Benner, Airbnb Sues over New Law Regulating New York Rentals, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/technology/new-york-passes-law-
airbnb.html?_r=0 (stating that New York State government has been fighting Airbnb by pro-
posing large fines for hosts).
7. See John Tozzi, Legal Issues on Table for Dinner-Party Startup, S.F. GATE (July 28,
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are considered food service establishments and need permits.”10  This law
creates an enormous problem for EatWith chefs and highlights the new
grey zone created by the sharing economy.  Traditionally, people often
chip in for food and allow a host of a casual dinner party to cook without a
permit.  The law seemingly allows this because friends and family differ
from “the public”.  Budding chefs, on the other hand, are stonewalled
from the wonderful resource of public financing because the law states
that they allow the public—rather than friends, family, or acquaintances—
to chip in for food.  In this manner, the chefs’ homes are classified as food
service establishments.
The EatWith example illustrates a unique aspect of the sharing econ-
omy.  It facilitates interaction with the public in ways that were tradition-
ally intimate.  In this way, the sharing economy blurs the distinction
between the public and the intimate and causes many legal headaches.
Uber is clearly part of the sharing economy, and, accordingly, it too is
blurring lines. Are its drivers employees or independent contractors?
Does it compete in the market of public transportation services, like taxis,
subways, and buses, or only with app-based ride-share services, or both?
What about with traditional black car service providers?  There are many
questions Uber raises about the values and principles of property and
ownership, but those are less relevant to the lawsuit in question.  Uber’s
business model fundamentally involves a transaction that is typically as
intimate as food consumption.  People normally secure rides either from
friends and family, or from established, highly regulated taxi or car ser-
vices.  In contrast, Uber allows people to get rides from complete strangers
in the drivers’ own vehicles with the touch of a smartphone.  Uber’s mem-
bership in the sharing economy and the innovation of its service ought to
play a role in how the courts handle lawsuits against it.
C. Uber’s Business Model
Uber began in 2008 as an idea to create an app to get a ride when a
person had trouble hailing a taxi.11  Today, the transportation juggernaut
allows people in cities around the world to get rides from entrepreneurial,
everyday people looking to make some extra money on the side by giving
rides in their personal vehicles.  This model cements Uber’s place in the
sharing economy because it takes a privately-owned resource—an individ-
ual’s vehicle—and allows owners to share it with third-parties who need it
when they do not.
From the consumers’ perspective, Uber is an app that connects them
with available drivers in their vicinity.  The app allows the rider to view the
estimated arrival time of their ride, car description, and likely fare calcu-
10. Id.
11. Our Story, UBER, https://www.uber.com/our-story/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2018).
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lated by the Uber Fare Estimator.12  After the ride, the rider’s credit card
or bank account is charged (in some locations, cash payment is availa-
ble).13  From the drivers’ perspective, things are not as simple as hitting
download in the app store.  Drivers must be at least twenty-one years old,
have three years of driving experience, and maintain in-state car insur-
ance. They must also possess a valid driver’s license, vehicle registration,
and a Social Security Number. Additionally, they must drive a vehicle with
in-state plates that is model year 2001 or later and passes an Uber car
inspection.14  Drivers are also subject to a background check and can be
deactivated if an investigation demonstrates that the driver has violated
the deactivation policy.15  Investigations are typically triggered through
multiple customer reviews complaining of conduct that violates the deac-
tivation policy or serious violations, even if isolated.16
The key aspect of the service that led to the lawsuit in question in this
Comment is Uber’s price algorithm.  The fare charged to consumers by
Uber drivers is calculated by the app’s built-in algorithm.17  The algorithm
notes how many consumers in a given geographic location are looking for
a ride on the app at a given time; the price of a ride increases along with
this demand.18  Therefore, if a lot of consumers simultaneously request a
ride in midtown Manhattan because there’s a thunderstorm after a Knicks
playoff game, there will be a significant increase in fares.  The fact that all
Uber drivers use the pricing algorithm is a necessary element of the allega-
tion that the drivers are engaged in a price fixing conspiracy that violates
the Sherman Act.  Uber has claimed that drivers have the freedom to de-
part from the algorithm so long as they depart downward.19  However, it
has been noted that there is no practical method that allows the drivers to
do so, because this can only be achieved after the rider has “hailed” the
driver and has therefore already agreed to the higher price.20  Addition-
ally, the complaint in Meyer v. Kalanick alleged that all drivers must use
12. How Does Uber Work?, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/738d1ff7-5fe0-4383-b34c-
4a2480efd71e (last visited Feb. 26, 2018); Getting a Fare Estimate, UBER, https://
help.uber.com/h/cc1efc16-df15-47f3-8057-61c2b75ea529 (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).
13. Id.
14. Uber Driver Requirements, ALVIA (July 28, 2015), http://www.alvia.com/uber-
driver-requirements/.
15. Uber Community Guidelines, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/deactivation-poli
cy/us-en/ (last updated Oct. 17, 2017).
16. Id.
17. How are Fares Calculated?, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/33ed4293-383c-4d73-
a610-d171d3aa5a78 (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). Note that “surge pricing” causes rate fluctua-
tion based on the algorithm’s calculated demand, meaning that the fares tend to “surge” at
times in an area when many people are likely to need a ride.
18. See id.
19. Thomas Dickerson & Silvia Hinds-Radix, Airbnb and Uber in New York City:
From Revolution to Institution, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 22, 2016, at 4.
20. Id.
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the algorithm.21  In fact, the defendant’s motion to dismiss arguably ad-
mits this fact when it states, “[h]ere, that independent action is the deci-
sion of each driver-partner to sign up with Uber and accept the contractual
terms offered, which include use of the pricing algorithm.”22  While it is
not entirely clear that drivers must use the algorithm, it does not appear
that the defense will be heavily contesting this portion of the allegations.
D. Independent Actors
At first glance, one might ask, “How can there be a price fixing con-
spiracy among Uber drivers if they all work for the same company?”
Surely, individual Ford factory managers do not violate the Sherman Act
when they agree with corporate headquarters on a uniform price for the
Mustang.  Rightfully so, a valid defense to an antitrust allegation is that
the agreement in question is among parties of the same firm.  Thus, there
is no antitrust violation because cooperation is necessary among members
of the same firm and the action is truly unilateral.23  This “single entity”
defense often arises when members of a joint venture or a parent corpora-
tion and its wholly or partially owned subsidiary are accused of a
conspiracy.24
That being said, such a defense would be futile in the Uber antitrust
case because Uber has not only admitted but also zealously argued that its
drivers are not employees or part of the Uber company.25  Uber, instead,
has claimed that its drivers are independent contractors.26  Uber has vigor-
ously argued this point in response to a host of other lawsuits involving
workers’ rights.27  In these other lawsuits, Uber drivers sued the company
to provide minimum wage, health benefits, mandatory overtime, and other
rights that the government requires employers to provide to its employees;
nonetheless, Uber has been able to successfully defend itself on the
grounds that the drivers are not employees but independent contractors.28
21. First Amended Complaint at 8–10, Meyer v. Kalanick, 200 F. Supp. 3d 408
(S.D.N.Y 2016) (No. 1:15 Civ. 9796), Doc. 1.
22. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Travis Kalanick’s Motion to Dis-
miss at 15, Meyer v. Kalanick, 200 F. Supp. 3d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:15 Civ. 9796).
23. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-69 (1984) (holding
that the Sherman Act “does not reach conduct that is ‘wholly unilateral’” (quoting Albrecht
v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
24. See id.; see also DEAN WILLIAMSON, ORGANIZATION, CONTROL AND THE SINGLE
ENTITY DEFENSE IN ANTITRUST (Dep’t Justice, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/atr/organiza-
tion-control-and-single-entity-defense-antitrust.
25. See Tracey Lien, Uber sued again over drivers’ employment status, L.A. TIMES




28. However, there is pending litigation and the Ninth Circuit upheld Uber’s arbitra-
tion provision in September 2016.
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Insisting on this point is what has opened the door to this antitrust lawsuit
because Uber has already relinquished a very potent defense.
E. Meyer v. Uber
The initial allegation of antitrust violations in the lawsuit—originally
entitled Meyer v. Kalanick—did not include Uber as a defendant.29  In the
original complaint, plaintiffs alleged only a horizontal price fixing conspir-
acy among Uber drivers.30  The Plaintiffs added the named defendant,
Travis Kalanick (former CEO of Uber) only after  he admitted in an inter-
view that he was also an Uber driver, and thus a member of the conspir-
acy.31  The Southern District of New York found that the pleadings were
also sufficient to allege a hub-and-spoke arrangement involving vertical
agreements between Kalanick in his capacity as CEO and the drivers be-
cause Kalanick designed the business model wherein drivers must use the
pricing algorithm central to the alleged conspiracy.32  This finding by
Judge Rakoff was made in the course of denying an early motion to dis-
miss.33  Building on the newly accepted hub-and-spoke theory, the plain-
tiffs made a motion to join Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber), which was
granted.34  The Second Circuit sent the case back down to the District
Court to determine if Uber waived its right to arbitrate with Meyer,
changing the case name to Meyer v. Uber.35  On remand, the Southern
District ruled that Uber did not waive its right to arbitrate the case, al-
though plaintiffs could appeal that decision in the future.36  Even if the
case does not go to trial, however, these arguments will be relevant for the
next sharing economy business to get sued under antitrust law.
II. MERITS OF POTENTIAL ANTITRUST ARGUMENTS
A. Hub-And-Spoke Arrangement
A hub-and-spoke arrangement refers to a situation in which a firm (the
hub) organizes collusion in upstream or downstream firms (the rim) by
interacting with each rim firm individually (spokes) in order to prevent its
market share from shrinking in some way or to maintain high profits.  This
form of collusion involves not only the vertical agreements between the
hub and the rim firms, but also implied horizontal agreements among the
rim firms.  The examples below illustrate how courts have been able to
29. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 21.
30. Id. at 1–3.
31. Id. at 2.
32. See Op. on Mot. to Dismiss at 18–19, Meyer, 200 F. Supp. 3d 408 (No. 15 Civ.
9796), Doc. 37.
33. See id.
34. See Mem. Order at 7, Meyer, 200 F. Supp. 3d 408 (No. 15 Civ. 9796), Doc. 90.
35. Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 866 F.3d 66, 94 (2d Cir. 2017).
36. See Meyer v. Uber, No. 1:2015-cv-09796-JSR, Doc. 173 at 4; 20–21 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
5, 2018).
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imply horizontal agreement among rim firms without concrete evidence of
direct communication.
The first discussion of a hub-and-spoke arrangement (although not us-
ing the term explicitly) occurred in the historic antitrust case, Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. United States.37  In Interstate Circuit, the industry at issue
involved movie production and distribution.  This industry, however,
looked far different in the 1930s than it does today.  At the time of the
case, there were eight main movie distributors and a series of first- and
second-run theaters nationwide.38  A first-run theater refers to the major
theaters that existed in large cities that were typically higher-end and more
expensive.  Interstate Circuit had a complete monopoly of first-run thea-
ters in five cities in Texas.39  Movie distributors would gradually send out
their new movie to the first-run theaters to build word-of-mouth popular-
ity and then, some time later, allow second-run theaters to show the movie
for a lower cost of admittance.  After a while, many people decided to
simply wait for the movies to appear in their local second-run theater so
they could see it at a lower cost.  This caused the first-run theaters to lose
business.  Interstate Circuit decided to act and sent letters to all eight ma-
jor movie distributors demanding each distributor require second-run the-
aters to raise their prices if they wanted to show the distributors’ films.40
Each distributor agreed, but there was no direct evidence of collusion be-
tween the distributors or any direct evidence that the distributors knew
what the others would do.41
The Supreme Court stated that it was permissible to draw the inference
of an agreement from the nature of the proposals made to the distributors
and from the unanimity among the distributors.42  The Court noted that
each distributor knew the proposal was under consideration by the other
distributors and that without unanimous action there was a risk of substan-
tial loss, but with unanimous action there was a prospect of increased prof-
its.43  This case established that such consciously parallel business conduct
could form the basis of an antitrust violation.44
A modern example of a hub-and-spoke arrangement can be found in
Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC.45  In the 1990s, Toys “R” Us was the largest
chain of retail toy stores in the U.S., controlling approximately twenty per-
cent of the market for all toys sold.46  The industry consisted of ten princi-
37. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
38. See id. at 214–15.
39. Id. at 215.
40. Id. at 215–17.
41. See id. at 221.
42. Id. at 224–27.
43. Id. at 222.
44. Richard A. Givens, Parallel Business Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 5 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 271, 277 (1960).
45. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000).
46. See In re Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.T.C. 415, 420 (1998).
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pal toy manufacturers.  In order of highest profit margin on toys, the
major players were retail toy stores (such as Toys “R” Us), specialized
discount stores, general discount stores, and warehouse clubs (such as
Costco) that sold toys in addition to numerous other goods.47  When the
toy manufacturers sold the same toys to both retail stores and warehouse
clubs, consumers could easily compare prices, leading to a loss in business
for the more expensive retail stores.  Evidence before the Seventh Circuit
showed that Toys “R” Us presented each toy manufacturer with a new
policy they would be required to adopt if they wanted to continue to do
business with them.48  The Toys “R” Us policy included demands that: the
warehouse clubs not be able to purchase one of the manufacturer’s new
products unless the warehouse carried their entire line; Toys “R” Us
would be given the first right to refuse all new products before these prod-
ucts would be shown to the warehouse clubs; and clearance items were
only permissible if Toys “R” Us had the first opportunity to buy the prod-
uct.49  In presenting these demands, Toys “R” Us also made it clear that
they would be going to all ten of the major toy manufacturers.  In fact,
Mattel and Hasbro executives testified that they went along with “the spe-
cial warehouse club policy” only because they believed their competitors
had agreed to it.50
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the FTC’s earlier decision that Toys
“R” Us had violated the Sherman Act.51  The court noted that, similar to
Interstate Circuit, each manufacturer’s decision to agree to Toys “R” Us’
demands represented an abrupt shift from previous business dealings.52
This case, however, was arguably more demonstrative of anticompetitive
conduct than Interstate Circuit due to the evidence regarding the commu-
nications.53  The court specifically stated that if there was no evidence in
the record tending to support concerted behavior, it would have ruled in
Toys “R” Us’ favor.54
United States v. Apple, Inc. presents another recent example of a hub-
and-spoke arrangement.55  The case involved the eBook industry, specifi-
cally, the six major publishers (the “Big Six”), Apple, and Amazon (Ap-
ple’s competitor).  Amazon sold eBooks for its Kindle at a very
competitive price of $9.99.56  Apple was about to enter the eBook market
with the much-anticipated iPad.57  Both Apple and the Big Six felt that
47. Toys “R” Us, 221 F.3d at 931.
48. Id. at 931–32.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 932–33.
51. Id. at 940.
52. Id. at 935–36.
53. Id. at 935.
54. Id. at 935–36.
55. See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015).
56. Id. at 296.
57. See id. at 301.
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Amazon’s pricing was too low and that it was destructive to the industry.58
Apple devised a plan in which it would implement the agency model,  al-
lowing the Big Six to set their own eBook prices under a certain ceiling
and splitting the profits 70/30 in the publishers’ favor.59  As part of the
plan, however, Apple would offer this agency model agreement to each of
the Big Six with the condition that they force all of their distributers
(namely, Amazon) to also operate under the agency model.60  Apple
made it clear that unless a “sufficient number” of the Big Six agreed to the
agency model, it would not bother building a bookstore for the iPad.61  All
six of the publishers agreed.
The Second Circuit found that this agreement had the effect of raising
eBook prices.62  The court noted that parallel conduct with respect to Ap-
ple’s individual agreements with each publisher was not enough to demon-
strate that it had organized a conspiracy to raise prices, but that the
presence of additional circumstantial evidence—tending to exclude the
possibility each of the Big Six acted independently—was sufficient to find
a conspiracy.63
The plaintiffs in the Uber case will argue that Uber has engaged in the
same conduct as the hubs (Interstate Circuit, Toys “R” Us, and Apple) in
the previously discussed cases.  They will argue that Uber orchestrates a
price fixing scheme among the drivers by making the drivers’ use of its app
contingent on agreeing to its pricing structure.  The theory will attempt to
analogize Uber’s conduct to that of the previously discussed hubs by char-
acterizing it as Uber reaching out to all potential drivers with a deal in-
volving anticompetitive price fixing, where those drivers have no choice
but to accept the deal if they wish to drive for Uber.  The theory claims the
drivers would not have accepted independently if they did not know the
other drivers were accepting as well.  The plaintiffs could further argue
that drivers would only agree to be Uber drivers if there were many Uber
drivers, which would indicate that Uber was successful and attracts many
consumers.  They could also note that, as in Apple, Uber is trying to main-
tain high prices; if drivers competed on price, prices would likely decrease,
leading to a decline in Uber’s profits.
Uber will likely argue that unlike many of the previously discussed
cases, the invitation—allegedly coercing the drivers to accept—is a noth-
ing more than a necessary feature of its product.  Part of the innovation
Uber provides is a coherent pricing structure that changes alongside de-
mand.  This is far different than the arbitrary invention of specific de-
mands sent out to the major players in the up- or downstream markets.
58. See id. at 301–02.
59. Id. at 303.
60. Id. at 303–04.
61. Id. at 318.
62. See id. at 311.
63. See id. at 316, 339.
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Additionally, Uber will likely argue it is different than the previously dis-
cussed defendants because of its place in the sharing economy, the secon-
dary nature of the fixed price (compared to the primary purpose of the
agreement: linking drivers and riders), and the number of spokes.  Addi-
tionally, Uber may characterize its conduct as multiple, independent verti-
cal agreements with each of its drivers.  The reality is that many potential
drivers do not accept Uber’s terms and do not become Uber drivers.  With
so many people not accepting the invitation, Uber’s conduct differs from
that of the other hubs because when a potential Uber driver makes a deci-
sion as whether to accept Uber’s terms, their decision has nothing to do
with whether other potential drivers are agreeing as well.  Also, Uber
could note that unlike in Interstate Circuit, Toys “R” Us, and Apple, Uber
is not using its price algorithm to drive out competitors.  In fact, the agree-
ment between Uber and its drivers has nothing to do with competing
firms.  Unlike in Apple, Uber is also not trying to maintain high prices in
response to a competitor looking to lower them, and nothing resembling
the threat of Amazon exists here.  Finally, Uber will likely note the scale
of the alleged implied horizontal agreement.  The alleged agreement in the
Uber case is vastly larger than any that has been found before.  In fact, the
largest successfully proven hub-and-spoke arrangement consisted of eight
sophisticated business leaders engaging in conduct that later allowed a
court to imply an agreement based on circumstantial evidence.  The num-
ber of Uber drivers dwarfs this eight-company conspiracy.  It is a stretch of
the imagination to conceive that thousands of individuals shared the same
level of interdependence as the previously discussed examples.
B. Ancillary Agreement
One defense to a price fixing allegation is: the alleged agreement is
part of a broader scheme, the main purpose of which was something other
than fixing prices.  This can best be seen in joint ventures.  A joint venture
involves two or more independent firms that agree to work together on
something new and separate from the individual firms.  This agreement
involves sharing resources, profits, and ideas.  By their nature, joint ven-
tures often require the firms to agree on a price to sell a product; however,
these agreements to fix the price do not violate the Sherman Act because
they are ancillary to the formation of the joint venture.
For example, Equilon Enterprises was a joint venture between Texaco,
Inc. and Shell Oil Co.64  The venture was established to refine and sell
gasoline from both firms in the western part of the United States under
both the Texaco and Shell Oil brand names.65  Texaco and Shell Oil histor-
ically competed with each other in the sale of gasoline, but this competi-
tion ended in the western part of the United States when they decided to
64. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 3 (2006).
65. Id.
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operate through Equilon.66  The Court held that the joint venture was le-
gitimate, and as such, the pricing decisions of that joint venture were not
per se unlawful under §1 of the Sherman Act.67  While the Court chose to
use the “single entity” defense as the reasoning behind its decision, the
Court clearly stated, “if we were to invoke the [ancillary restraints] doc-
trine in [this case], Equilon’s pricing policy is clearly ancillary to the sale of
its own products.”68
Under the ancillary restraints doctrine, Texaco and Shell Oil would
have been allowed to agree on the price of Equilon because that agree-
ment was ancillary to the broader agreement to work together in creating
Equilon and to enter the western U.S. market for the sale of gasoline.
Likewise, the agreement between Uber and its drivers to use the com-
pany’s pricing algorithm could similarly be viewed as ancillary to the
broader agreement to work together to break into the transportation ser-
vices market in each of the cities in which Uber operates.  Agreeing to
become an Uber driver could be fueled by many forces, the most impor-
tant of which (when compared to simply starting one’s own driving ser-
vice) is access to a tremendous number of consumers who are willing to
pay you to drive them around.  Without Uber, these drivers would likely
never be able to earn an adequate income as an independent, part-time
driver with no marketing budget or access to consumers.  Without inde-
pendently contracted drivers, Uber would have to hire people as employ-
ees, which would come with enormous overhead costs.  This partnership
between Uber and its drivers is primarily designed to allow both “firms” to
enter the transportation services market in select cities while sharing each
other’s resources.  Uber could argue that the agreement by which prices
are set through an algorithm is merely ancillary to this joint venture.
C. Vertical Restraints
Vertical restraints are agreements between a firm and another firm lo-
cated in either the up- or downstream market.  In other words, these are
agreements that are not between competitors, yet may still come under
antitrust scrutiny.  Due to the fact that such agreements are far less likely
to produce anticompetitive results, all vertical restraints are now analyzed
under the rule of reason, rather than per se analysis.69  One main concern
motivating the application of the rule of reason to these agreements is that
the use of a per se rule would infringe upon business’ rights to make inde-
pendent business decisions involving which firms they choose to deal.  This
concern was addressed in United States v. Colgate, in which the Supreme
66. Id. at 3–5.
67. Id. at 8.
68. Id. at 7–8.
69. Under the rule of reason, if a practice is found to be restrictive based on the total-
ity of the circumstances, it must be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on com-
petition. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) (quoting
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)).
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Court noted that a business has the power to determine with whom to do
business.70  Specifically, the Court held,
[T]he [Sherman Act] does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his
own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of
course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will
refuse to sell.71
Colgate involved a company that refused to sell its product to busi-
nesses that resold its products below a certain price.72 The Court’s deci-
sion allows businesses to enforce a policy whereby they will not deal with
resellers that charge less than a certain price.73
The Uber case involves the agreement between Uber and its drivers to
use the pricing algorithm, which arguably represents a vertical restraint on
pricing.  The plaintiffs may argue that under the rule of reason, the agree-
ment between Uber and its drivers to use the pricing algorithm is anticom-
petitive.  They would argue that unlike resale price maintenance (“RPM”)
agreements, the pricing algorithm does nothing to protect the integrity or
reputation of the product—factors which tend to convince the enforce-
ment agencies that RPM arrangements are not anticompetitive.74  First,
the pricing algorithm represents a far more restrictive policy than a typical
RPM agreement in that it does not merely set the floor or ceiling for pric-
ing, but instead determines the exact price at which the drivers’ services
must be sold.  Next, mandatory use of the pricing algorithm is arguably
unnecessary for the success of the product and the business.  If Uber al-
lowed drivers to set their own price, drivers would be able to open the app,
see the prices of nearby drivers, and set an appropriate price based on
market forces.  Additionally, users could still open the app, see all the
prices different drivers were offering, and select a driver accordingly.
Under this theory, forcing drivers to use the pricing algorithm is anticom-
petitive and presents no procompetitive justifications.  Moreover, the ver-
tical agreements violate the Sherman Act, and Uber should be forced to
stop making a potential Uber driver’s successful application contingent on
an agreement to use of the Uber algorithm.
On the other hand, Uber could argue that—much like RPM agree-
ments where companies have a policy to deal only with resellers who will
sell above a certain price—Uber may, as a policy, choose to deal only with
contractors who are willing to use the algorithm.  The drivers—performing
services under the Uber brand—are a reflection on the company, just as a
reseller selling a manufacturer’s product reflects the manufacturer.  Uber
70. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
71. Id. at 307.
72. See id. at 302–03.
73. See id. at 307.
74. See generally Manufacturer-imposed Requirements, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/dealings-supply-chain/manufacturer-im
posed (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
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can decide it wants its fares at prices that properly reflect demand because
prices too high or low would reflect poorly on their brand.  Additionally,
Uber may decide that the best way to mitigate this risk is to require the
use of the price algorithm.  Uber could also argue that it wants to maintain
a sense of consistency for its users, which would explain why simply setting
a price floor would be insufficient.  If all drivers could set different prices,
Uber users might become so flustered or dissatisfied that they would stop
using the service.
The plaintiffs, nonetheless, could argue that this case is similar to
United States v. Topco Assocs. in that Uber is placing a facially anticompe-
titive restriction on its drivers to compete in a larger market.75  In Topco,
the defendant was a cooperative association of about twenty-five regional
supermarkets that operated independently, but that joined together for
the purpose of creating a line of store brand products that could compete
more effectively with the large national chains.76  Topco restricted the sale
of Topco-brand products by granting to its constituent firms the exclusive
right to sell the products in assigned geographic territories in order to sim-
ulate the type of exclusivity enjoyed by the national chains with their pri-
vately owned product lines.77  The Court rejected Topco’s justifications
and found the conduct to be per se unlawful horizontal territorial restraint
under the Section 1 of the Sherman Act.78
Accordingly, the plaintiffs in the Uber case could argue that Uber is
engaging in outright price fixing and that Topco disavowed the goal of
strengthening competitiveness in the larger transportation industry as a
justification for restricting competition among the individual drivers.  To
differentiate its agreement from that at issue in Topco, Uber may argue
that Topco’s conduct was analyzed as a horizontal agreement because the
regional supermarkets were Topco and as such Topco’s restrictions were in
fact an agreement amongst competitors.  In this case, Uber could assert
that it is not an association of drivers, but rather a tech company setting
the rules for its suppliers (contracting drivers) using its app, thereby mak-
ing the restraint vertical.  Additionally, Uber could argue that it is not jus-
tifying its conduct by saying it increases competition in a larger market;
instead, it will argue that the drivers are part of the same market as taxis
and car services.  In Topco, regional and national supermarket markets
were clearly distinct from each other, while a ride in a city is a far more
fungible product.
Plaintiffs could also argue that Uber’s conduct does not really resemble
RPM at all.  Unlike a manufacturer, Uber is not concerned about the re-
sale of its product. The drivers are independent contractors.  As such,
Uber’s product is not the ride itself, but rather the app that connects driv-
75. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 604–05 (1972).
76. Id. at 599–601.
77. Id. at 605–06.
78. See id. at 607–12.
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ers to riders.  Riders ought to know that these independent contractors are
not Uber employees and that they do not represent Uber in any way; they
are merely independent service providers that have signed up to use the
app to connect with riders.  Therefore, Uber should not be concerned with
the price because it is based on the app’s functionality and not the driver
or the services provided by the driver.
Uber would likely argue in response that, following this logic, the com-
pany theoretically would then not care to have a say in the quality of the
rides, safety of the riders, or other aspects of the ride that it clearly works
to improve.  This argument would hold that whatever the deal is between
Uber and its drivers, consumers will undoubtedly associate the service
they receive with the Uber app, and as such, it is imperative that Uber
maintain the integrity of the ride itself (including price) because it directly
implicates its brand.
The defense’s arguments outlined above probably also serve as their
best theory of the case, assuming narratives that characterize Uber’s con-
duct as per se unlawful are rejected by the court.  To avoid the possibility
of an inference of unlawful horizontal agreement, Uber’s narrative ought
to be that it has made numerous, albeit identical, vertical agreements with
individual drivers without regard to concerns about competitors.  Describ-
ing the facts in this manner offers a clear way to avoid antitrust liability, as
well as precedential benefits that will be discussed in Section IV.  Under
the rule of reason, the crux of the analysis engaged in by a judge or jury
that will decide the case is whether or not the conduct is anticompetitive.
Uber’s potential argument about preserving its business by setting a rea-
sonable price standard for the goal of uniformity is persuasive.  However,
the same could be said for the plaintiffs’ potential argument that Uber
would lose no consumers by allowing drivers to set different prices.  The
outcome of this theory will come down to the evidence presented, specifi-
cally expert testimony regarding how consumers might respond if drivers
set their own prices.  The court would have to decide whether any harm
would come from removing the restriction requiring use of the algorithm,
because without some showing that Uber needs the algorithm to operate,
there is arguably no reason it should escape antitrust liability.
D. BMI
Finally, Uber would be remiss not to mention the “BMI Defense.” In
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, CBS alleged that the blanket licenses for
copyrighted music Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) was selling violated the
Sherman Act as illegal price-fixing.79  CBS argued that BMI fixed the
prices of individual performers’ copyrighted music instead of allowing bid-
ding on each song under normal market conditions.80  In its opinion up-
holding the validity of the licenses, the Supreme Court noted all of the
79. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 6 (1979).
80. See id. at 8–9.
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procompetitive justifications for blanket licensing agreements, including
allowing owners of copyrighted material to have a reliable method of col-
lecting earnings, avoiding expensive and complicated individual transac-
tions, and allowing users to get the “unplanned, rapid, and indemnified
access” that they wanted.81  More importantly, the Court held that blanket
licenses are unique and that they are truly a different product than the
individual licenses of which they are made up.82  Specifically, the Court
noted, “[H]ere, the whole is truly greater than the sum of its parts; it is, to
some extent, a different product . . . in short, [BMI] made a market in
which individual composers are inherently unable to compete.”83  While
succeeding cases in which parties have attempted to use this argument
have failed—the Supreme Court relegated BMI to one-hit wonder status,
so to speak—the case remains good law.84
While neither overturned nor reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, the
BMI defense was subsequently deployed in National Bancard Corp.
(NaBanco) v. VISA U.S.A., Inc.85 NaBanco involved the complex market
of credit card transactions, which consists of cardholders, merchants, card-
issuing banks, and merchant-signing banks.86  In the typical transaction for
this market, the merchant-signing bank must “interchange” the receipt of
a credit card transaction to the card-issuing bank so that it may charge the
cardholder.87  In the Visa system, a fee is charged to the merchant-signing
bank for the interchange called an “Issuer’s Reimbursement Fee”
(“IRF”), which is calculated as a fixed percentage of each charge.88  How-
ever, when the card-issuing bank and the merchant-signing bank are the
same bank—a so-called “on-us transaction”—the fee is waived because
there is no interchange.89  NaBanco argued that the banks that controlled
Visa’s board of directors were fixing the price of the interchange sale by
setting the IRF.90  NaBanco argued both that this agreement was per se
unlawful and that it was anticompetitive under the rule of reason because
it reduced competition by giving those banks that both issue cards and sign
merchants a price advantage over those that did not.91 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit ruled in Visa’s favor, citing BMI. The court reasoned that “[f]or a
payment system like VISA to function, rules must govern the in-
81. See id. at 20–21.
82. See id. at 21–22.
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Nat’l Col-
legiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
85. See Nat’l Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986) (Na-
tional Bancard Corp. is commonly referred to as “NaBanco”).
86. Id. at 594.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 596.
90. Id. at 601.
91. Id. at 596, 604.
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terchange. . .[t]he IRF represents one such rule establishing a ‘necessary’
term, without which the system would not function.”92
BMI and NaBanco stand for the assertion that a product created to
streamline what would otherwise be an unreasonably massive number of
individually negotiated contracts, and that may require (in their nature) a
fixed price, should be analyzed under the rule of reason.  While the means
employed to create that product technically involves the fixing of a price,
channels of commerce may be opened up that would otherwise be closed
off, and thus, the conduct on the whole increases competition.  Uber fits
this mold; without an easily accessible purchasing platform, drivers would
be left to individually negotiate rides with each rider.  This need would
inevitably lead to far fewer rides and, therefore, fewer transactions be-
cause consumers would have go out and haggle each time they needed a
ride.  The real question is whether fixing the price of the rides via the
algorithm is necessary for Uber’s product to exist.  One could argue that
the licensing agreements in BMI and the IRFs in NaBanco were far more
complex than ride purchase transactions.  The calculation of the price of a
ride essentially comes down to time and distance.  Licensing entails a
much larger set of variables such as the size of the audience, the format of
the music, accessibility, and many additional factors.  The IRFs repre-
sented a small part of an intricate market involving three to four parties
per transaction.  Additionally, in both BMI and NaBanco, it could be ar-
gued that the technology to post all sellers’ individually determined prices
at once for the consumer to conveniently choose did not exist.  In Uber’s
case, it seems it could be possible to let drivers create their own formula
and have individually calculated prices for each driver appear in the app,
so that drivers could compete against each other on price.  That being said,
an argument could be made that individual drivers and riders are in a far
worse position to effectively negotiate than credit card merchants, banks,
artists, and licensees.
Ultimately, Uber’s algorithm has been a part of its product from the
beginning and the product has opened up a new channel of commerce by
avoiding a massive number of individual negotiations, much like both BMI
and Visa. Therefore, this argument is a persuasive one, and Meyer v. Uber
could be the case that reinvigorates the BMI defense, should it go to trial.
Similar to the vertical restraints narrative, this defense only prevails if
Uber can prove that the pricing algorithm is a necessary feature of the
Uber product.
III. DEFINING A MARKET IN THE SHARING ECONOMY
A. Hypothetical Monopolist Test
Now that the relevant antitrust arguments have been discussed, it is
important to examine one of the most critical pieces of evidence in many
antitrust cases—market definition.  The hypothetical monopolist test (also
92. Id. at 602.
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referred to as the “SSNIP” test)93 is the standard method for defining
markets in antitrust cases.94  The test attempts to define the relevant mar-
ket by hypothesizing that the defendant is a monopoly that initiates a price
increase of a significant amount (usually five to ten percent); following
such an increase, the test asks whether consumers switch to substitute
products or services in order to avoid the price increase and within what
geographic area would they be willing to find such substitutes.  If consum-
ers would switch to a given product or go to a competitor in a given loca-
tion to avoid the small but significant price increase, then that product or
geographic area is determined to be a satisfactory substitute and can be
considered part of the product or geographic market in which the defen-
dant competes when determining the defendant’s market share and, ulti-
mately, market power.95
B. Product Market
Using the hypothetical monopolist test, each party will make argu-
ments and offer expert opinions to defend their definition of the relevant
market.  This will be a vital determination for the fact finder because it
could determine whether the defendant has market power, which plays a
key role in rule of reason analysis.  At this stage in the Uber case, both
parties have made arguments relating to the relevant product market.  The
defense would like to include taxis, driving services, and even public trans-
portation in the list of sufficient substitutes that would prevent Uber from
successfully raising prices in the hypothetical monopolist test.  The plain-
tiffs, on the other hand, allege in the Complaint that Uber’s experts have
suggested Uber has fifty to seventy percent of a market in some cities (this
estimate includes taxis, cars for hire, and mobile-app generated ride-share
services).96  The plaintiffs would like to limit the list of sufficient substi-
tutes only to other “mobile app-generated ride-share services” such as
Lyft.97  The plaintiffs have alleged that in this more limited market, Uber
has an eighty percent market share, which would indicate market power
and tend to make Uber’s procompetitive justifications less likely to prevail
in a rule of reason analysis.98  In making these arguments, the parties have
not yet addressed how Uber’s membership in the sharing economy makes
this analysis different—possibly indicating that neither party believes it
does.
The innovation of businesses operating in the sharing economy is not
embodied in a new device you can buy at the store and take home.  It is
93. SSNIP is a commonly used acronym for the phrase “Small but Significant and
Non-Transitory Increase in Price.”
94. See SERGE MORESI ET AL., ANTITRUST ECON. FOR LAW. 1 (2017 ed.) (Market
Definition).
95. See id. at 5–6.
96. First Amended Complaint, supra note 21, ¶ 107.
97. Id. ¶¶ 94–97.
98. See id.
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usually found in a simple, user-friendly platform that allows people to
cheaply replace things they would normally solicit from traditional busi-
nesses (e.g., rides from a taxi service, rooms from a hotel, etc.) with things
already privately owned by individuals who do not need to use those
things at the time the consumer wants to use them.  This allows users to
access incredibly cheap goods and services that traditionally could have
been quite expensive.  These savings come from the fact that the people
operating on sharing economy platforms own the goods and do not need
to use them all the time.  There is essentially no overhead cost, and any
profits the goods could provide would go unrealized without those plat-
forms because they would be sitting idle, so these operators can afford to
price fairly low while remaining profitable.  Uber has argued in their mo-
tion to dismiss that only mobile app-based ride-share services should be
considered part of the relevant market, excluding traditional taxi services
and public transportation.99  This ignores the reality of the sharing econ-
omy, which is that it exists to compete against and to potentially replace
the traditional, more costly method by which the services were previously
consumed.  This is not only intuitive, but it is supported by significant data.
For example, medallion prices for cabs in New York City went down forty
percent in 2015, a drastic change after increasing fifty percent over the five
prior years.100  Also, in 2015 the New York City taxis created the Arro
app, where people can hail taxis similarly to how they would get a ride
from Uber.101  The direct effect Uber’s presence and popularity has on the
value and on the progression of the taxi service as a product clearly dem-
onstrates that the two compete against each other for the same consumers.
As Airbnb is to the traditional hotel industry, Uber is an innovative
alternative to traditional transportation services.  Both are able to com-
pete at a high level in industries that, due to the need for scaling, tradition-
ally have been difficult to break into because they rely on individuals and
their privately-owned property, rather than trying to acquire that property
and provide those services on their own.  While the method of attracting
consumers and providing the service may differ from the methods em-
ployed by taxis and traditional car services, the consumer is still buying a
ride, and all three types of services compete against each other to provide
that ride.
C. Geographic Market
The definition of geographic market will likely be less contentious in
this case than the product market.  Uber operates in select major cities and
regions just outside of those major cities.102  The geographic location may
99. Id.
100. Chris Isidore, New York City’s Yellow Cab Crisis, CNN MONEY (July 22, 2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/21/news/companies/nyc-yellow-taxi-uber.
101. Davey Alba, NYC’s Taxis Finally Launch An App To Compete With Uber, WIRED
(Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/08/arrow-ny-taxis-app.
102. See Cities, UBER, https://www.uber.com/cities/ (last visited July 5, 2018).
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revert to the product market dispute if either side argues that substitutes
are different in different cities. For example, New York City has an intri-
cate subway system, whereas many other cities have a much less diverse
option of subway lines. One could argue that the subway is a viable substi-
tute in New York City, but not in the other cities where Uber operates.
For a company that provides transportation, Uber’s product is not one that
a consumer could travel elsewhere to get. A person who needs a ride in
San Francisco would not be willing to go to a different city to get a ride
from a competing service in the way they might be willing to do so for a
more tangible product like a car. The nature of Uber’s product and the
clearly defined cities in which they operate will likely leave the geographic
market largely undisputed.
IV. PRECEDENT FOR THE SHARING ECONOMY
The ultimate resolution of the Uber case may set important precedent
for future antitrust cases against companies in the relatively new sharing
economy.  Many of these sharing economy platforms involve everyday
people that have become quasi-businesses, and it is not too farfetched to
imagine how the agreements necessary to operate on these platforms
could be subject to antitrust laws in the future—especially if the plaintiffs
in the Uber case win.  This section will look at the two potential theories
related to the sharing economy the plaintiffs could raise in Uber that a
court might entertain and will examine what the reasoning the court pro-
vides with its ruling might mean for future sharing economy cases.
A. Hub-and-Spoke Reasoning
 If the court subscribes to the plaintiffs’ theory that Uber is engaged in an
implied horizontal price-fixing agreement, it would have to do so by char-
acterizing the case as a hub-and-spoke arrangement.  While distinctions
surely exist between Uber’s conduct and that of other hubs in hub-and-
spoke arrangements, noting the court’s decision was also based off Uber’s
presence in the sharing economy would send a different message to the
major firms in other sharing economy platforms.  However, to send the
clearest message, the court would have to draft its opinion very carefully
so as not to describe such a small window that Uber fits through, but
through which other sharing economy platform firms may not.
For example, if a decision in Uber’s favor is based on Uber drivers’
lack of knowledge that the other drivers would agree to Uber’s invitation,
difficulties could arise for future sharing economy defendants.  It is easy to
imagine a procompetitive service that antitrust laws theoretically should
protect that would nonetheless fall victim to this reasoning.  For example,
consider a bike-share app that utilizes a price algorithm that shows users
the other users in the area that have also agreed to the app’s terms.  This
might be helpful because it would encourage potential new users to join,
as the service would only be beneficial if there were other nearby users.  If
the court allows Uber to exist based on the reasoning that they could not
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infer an agreement because the drivers did not know about each other,
such bike service would not find a valid defense from the precedent set by
the Uber case.
The more interesting and important analysis lies in the central question
of antitrust law, namely, whether the conduct is anticompetitive.  Charac-
terizing Uber’s case as a hub-and-spoke arrangement would leave the
court in a difficult situation because if they find an implied agreement
among the drivers, the agreement would be per se unlawful, and no further
analysis would be warranted.  This result occurs unless the court accepts a
BMI defense.  Utilizing this line of reasoning, the court would hold that
this agreement constituted price fixing, but that the situation nonetheless
warrants rule of reason analysis, ultimately deciding the product on the
whole is procompetitive.
If the court finds Uber is not engaged in an implied agreement, it could
still find that the drivers knew about each other but did not agree.  It is not
hard to imagine Uber’s arrangement as one similar to the hub-and-spoke
arrangements previously discussed.  Uber could reach out to every poten-
tial driver through advertising, and these drivers could all agree—with the
knowledge that anyone who signs up to be an Uber driver will also be
agreeing on prices—to use the Uber algorithm.  However, that is not why
an Uber driver elects to enlist with the company.  The other previously
discussed hub-and-spoke arrangements are unlawful because those busi-
ness decisions make no economic sense in the absence of implicit collu-
sion.  Assuming Uber does not allow drivers to deviate from the
algorithm, it would still make sense for an individual driver to agree to the
terms because it grants them access to thousands of consumers he or she
would otherwise have no way of reaching.  The risk of other drivers forgo-
ing Uber to charge lower prices on their own is unrealistic because each of
those drivers lacks the network of consumers required to adequately com-
pete with an Uber driver.  Therefore, it makes economic sense for drivers
to independently agree to use Uber’s price algorithm regardless of what
other drivers may do.
Since the conduct does not demonstrate collusion, organizing a deci-
sion using this reasoning would allow Uber to continue its operations with-
out pigeonholing future sharing economy companies into a position where
they must prevent users from learning that other users have accepted the
company’s pricing structure.  Because the drivers’ act of agreeing to utilize
the Uber app can be distinguished from outright price-fixing, and such a
defense could even be presented in the face of a per se analysis of the hub-
and-spoke arrangement, the above reasoning could properly result in a
dismissal without changing existing law.
B. Vertical Restraints Reasoning
If the court opts to ignore the hub-and-spoke theory altogether be-
cause the thought of thousands of drivers globally engaging in an implicit
agreement to fix prices is so implausible, then it will likely turn to the
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vertical restraints characterization of the case.  This result could realisti-
cally occur because, as mentioned earlier, other notable hub-and-spoke
arrangements involve a very small number of spokes, making implicit col-
lusion easier to prove.  However, the situation in this case deviates so
greatly from those cases that a court may reject the comparison outright.
By treating the case as a challenge of thousands of vertical agreements
between Uber and each individual driver, the court would allow a more in-
depth analysis because it would be operating under the rule of reason.
The court could truly dive into why Uber is procompetitive for the
transportation industry, and that analysis would likely start with Uber’s
market definition.  By including taxis and other driving services in Uber’s
relevant market, the court would be better able to demonstrate the
procompetitive value Uber offers.  Specifically, these other transportation
options are not only substitutes for Uber in the hypothetical monopolist
test, but they are exactly the competitors Uber was designed to compete
with.  Uber offers a great new product that is forcing traditional transpor-
tation services to become more readily available to consumers.  For exam-
ple, in 2015, New York City taxis created the Arro app that allowed people
to hail taxis similarly to how they would get a ride from Uber.103  This
innovation was in direct response to Uber’s popularity and resulted in a
better product from a competitor, a true sign of healthy competition in a
common market.  The court could identify Uber as a sharing economy
platform and could demonstrate that these platforms are procompetitive;
they challenge existing traditional services to improve and adapt to con-
sumers’ craving for convenience.
The above procompetitive justifications defend Uber’s existence, but
the pricing algorithm is what needs proper justification as the primary
mechanism restraining trade at issue.  The court should accept Uber’s po-
tential argument that the pricing algorithm is procompetitive because it
maintains uniformity within its service and confidence among its users that
they will be offered reasonable prices when they open the app.  Forcing
drivers to constantly update their pricing to compete with other drivers,
moreover, is extremely dangerous.  Uber’s current price changes are in-
stantaneous, and a ruling that the pricing algorithm is anticompetitive
would force individual drivers—who often work part-time—to somehow
calculate the appropriate fare for each ride they provide.  With such a dif-
ficult task forced upon the drivers—one that would likely result in widely
varying fares for consumers—Uber’s entire business model could be up-
ended and all of the above procompetitive justifications for its existence
would disappear, along with the business.  Competing on price is a funda-
mental principle of antitrust law, but Uber’s business model is successful,
at least in part, because it provides a pricing algorithm along with its abil-
ity to connect drivers and riders.  Therefore, the pricing algorithm is
procompetitive in that it is a fundamental part of Uber.  Of course, if the
court finds through expert testimony that no harm would come by having
103. Alba, supra note 101.
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drivers set their own prices and that natural market forces would guide the
price of rides to a reasonable fare, the court would have to rule in the
plaintiffs’ favor, as forcing use of the algorithm is clearly a pricing
restraint.
By holding that the agreements between sharing economy platforms
and the independent contractors who operate on them are procompetitive
if they are necessary for or enhance the success of the platform itself, the
Uber case could pave the way for more confidence in investment and re-
search in new platforms to transform other industries into more conve-
nient versions of themselves in the future.
CONCLUSION
As to the merits of this case, it is unlikely that the plaintiffs will suc-
ceed.  The most convincing narratives that the plaintiffs could offer would
be that (1) Uber is engaged in a hub-and-spoke arrangement in which an
agreement between the drivers is implied and (2) numerous vertical re-
straints between Uber and each driver are anticompetitive under the rule
of reason.  As previously discussed, the hub-and-spoke narrative is likely
to fail because Uber should be able to demonstrate the key factual differ-
ences between its conduct and that of traditional hubs in traditional hub-
and-spoke cases.  Also, there is the potential for a persuasive use of the
BMI defense, arguing that even if there were an agreement, the case
should nonetheless be analyzed under the rule of reason.  As for the verti-
cal restraints narrative, there are several procompetitive justifications for
the pricing algorithm that should serve as successful defenses against the
claim that the agreement is anticompetitive under the rule of reason.
A decision in favor of the plaintiffs could result in the complete dis-
banding of Uber; the result of forcing Uber to hire drivers as part-time
employees; or the requirement of allowing drivers to set their own prices.
Any of these measures, combined with the enormous treble damages
payouts of antitrust cases, could be catastrophic to Uber’s business. Any
form of sanctions could also be seen as the court preventing a tech com-
pany’s innovation from offering a great new form of transportation be-
loved in cities worldwide, thus discouraging new innovation, growth, and
investment in existing and developing sharing economy platforms.
The sharing economy has been met with much criticism and concern.
Governments often fight the firms operating on these platforms for fear of
safety, workers’ rights, tax avoidance, discrimination, and lost revenue is-
sues.  While each of these issues has been fiercely debated and widely dis-
cussed, they play no role in an antitrust analysis.  Social welfare is not a
valid defense against allegations of antitrust violations, so neither should it
be a consideration tending toward a finding of an antitrust violation
(outside of the social welfare associated with consumer protection and the
goals of antitrust law).  The sharing economy has demonstrated its ability
to offer innovative platforms that are indisputably procompetitive.  When
looking at Uber empirically, it is clear that the service increases competi-
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tion in the broad market of transportation.  As enhancing or diminishing
competition is the ultimate issue antitrust laws look to analyze, the lawsuit
against Uber ought to be dismissed under the rule of reason.  In doing so,
however, the court must explain why Uber and its conduct are procompe-
titive. Doing so need not include an attempt to thread the needle of Uber’s
conduct through decades of precedent.  However, it must include facing
the reality of how the development of the sharing economy makes Uber,
its market, and its conduct fundamentally different from other hub-and-
spoke arrangements.  It is these differences that will allow other innova-
tive platforms to be developed and invested in without fear of harsh anti-
trust ramifications.
As mentioned earlier, these potential impacts will only come to frui-
tion if the case ends up going to trial, rather than being sent to arbitration.
Regardless, these potential arguments ought to serve as a guide for the
next sharing economy platform business to be challenged under antitrust
law.
